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Sifting Through the Fallout of North Carolina's Death Penalty
Jurisprudence: Getting Down to the Real McKoy
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-
year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.1
North Carolina, like many states, has struggled to fashion capital sentenc-
ing guidelines that accommodate both the constitutional protections required by
the eighth and fourteenth amendments and the state's desire for a forceful and
extensively utilized death penalty.2 The United States Supreme Court has made
clear that capital sentencers must not wield limitless discretion; 3 yet the Court
has also held that states may not remove the sentencer's discretion altogether.
4
Thus, capital sentencers must exercise discretion in a manner that is constitu-
tionally appropriate.
5
One way in which states have guided the discretion of capital sentencers has
been to require them to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances at a
separate sentencing phase to determine whether the death penalty is appropriate
in each case.6 North Carolina jury instructions and verdict forms require jurors
1. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
2. For discussions of the evolution of capital sentencing in North Carolina, see State v.
McKoy, 327 N.C. 31, 39-42, 394 S.E.2d 426, 431-32 (1990); Exum, Symposium Address" The Death
Penalty in North Carolina, 8 CAMPBELL L. REv. 1 (1985); Weissman, Sentencing Due Process:
Evolving Constitutional Principles, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 523 (1982); Comment, Vague and
Overlapping Guidelines: A Study of North Carolina's Capital Sentencing Statute, 16 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 765 (1980); Note, Criminal Procedure-North Carolina's Capital Sentencing Procedure: The
Struggle for an Acceptable Jury Instruction, 62 N.C.L. REv. 833 (1984); Note, Criminal Procedure-
Limitations Upon the Jury's Discretion in Capital Punishment Sentencing-State v. Pinch, 19 WAKE
FOREsT L. REv. 621 (1983).
3. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
6. North Carolina's capital criminal procedure is bifurcated into a guilt phase and a sentenc-
ing phase. After the guilt phase of the trial, both the State and the defendant are given the opportu-
nity to offer evidence relevant to sentencing:
After hearing the evidence, argument of counsel, and instructions of the court, the jury
shall deliberate and render a sentence recommendation to the court, based upon the follow-
ing matters:
(1) Whether any sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances as enumerated in
subsection (e) exist;
(2) Whether any sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances as enumerated in sub-
section (f), which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found, ex-
ist; and
(3) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or
to imprisonment in the State's prison for life.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1988).
In order to recommend a sentence of death, the jury must find three things:
(1) The statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which the jury finds beyond
a reasonable doubt; and
(2) That the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by the jury are
sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty; and
(3) That the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the ag-
gravating circumstance or circumstances found.
Id. § 15A-2000(c).
to unanimously find both aggravating and mitigating circumstances before giv-
ing either any weight in the final sentencing decision. The Supreme Court disap-
proved unanimity requirements for mitigating circumstances in Mills v.
Maryland,7 and the Court squarely addressed the unanimity issue in McKoy v.
North Carolina.8 In McKoy, the Court unequivocally held unconstitutional any
requirement that a jury unanimously find mitigating circumstances before giving
them any weight in sentencing.9
This Note examines the progression of McKoy through the North Carolina
and United States Supreme Courts and the case's implications for imposition of
the death penalty in North Carolina. Studying eighth amendment jurisprudence
through Mills, the Note demonstrates that McKoy was a logical and necessary
application of Mills. The Note outlines the analysis that will be required of
North Carolina courts in resentencing in light of McKoy the many defendants
whose juries were given unconstitutional instruction. The Note concludes that
the McKoy decision eliminates any doubt left after Mills regarding the con-
stitutionality of unanimity requirements for jury findings of mitigating
circumstances.
A jury found Dock McKoy guilty of first degree murder.10 The trial then
proceeded to the sentencing phase, in which the jury addressed four successive
issues in order to decide whether to impose the death penalty. First, the jury
considered whether there were any aggravating circumstances and unanimously
found two such circumstances propounded by the prosecution.11 Second, the
jury assessed whether any mitigating circumstances existed. 2 The trial judge
instructed the jury that it had to be unanimous on any mitigating circumstances
it found. 13 Of eight possible mitigating circumstances, the jury unanimously
found only two to be present.1 4 Third, the jury determined that the two mitigat-
7. 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) ("We conclude that there is a substantial probability that reason-
able jurors ... well may have thought they were precluded from considering any mitigating evidence
unless all 12 jurors agreed on the existence of a particular such circumstance.... We therefore
vacate the judgment.").
8. 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990).
9. Id. at 1228-29.
10. State v. McKoy (McKoy 1), 323 N.C. 1, 6, 372 S.E.2d 12, 14 (1988), vacated sub nom.
McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227, on remand sub nom. State v. McKoy (McKoy II), 327
N.C. 31, 394 S.E.2d 426 (1990).
Dock McKoy's conviction stemmed from an incident on December 22, 1984, when the Anson
County Sheriff's Department responded to a call from McKoy's neighbor, who reported that
McKoy had been firing shots into the air. Id. at 6, 372 S.E.2d at 15. McKoy caused a great distur-
bance in the neighborhood by firing three shots in the direction of a teenager. Id. Two deputies
responded to the complaint and asked McKoy to come outside. Id. McKoy first responded that he
would kill them if they did not leave, and then fired one shot that hit an officer; the officer later died
from the wound. Id. McKoy surrendered only after the officers threw tear gas into his house and
engaged him in a brief exchange of gun fire. Id.
11. The jury found that "McKoy had been previously convicted of a felony involving violence
to the person... and [that] the murder was committed against a deputy sheriff while engaged in the
performance of his official duties." McKoy II, 327 N.C. at 35, 394 S.E.2d at 428.
12. The verdict form explicitly required the jury to "answer 'no' to any mitigating circum-
stances on which the jurors were unable to reach unanimous agreement." Brief for the Petitioner at
3, McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990) (No. 88-5909).
13. McKoy 11, 327 N.C. at 35, 394 S.E.2d at 428.
14. The jury found:
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ing circumstances did not outweigh the two aggravating circumstances. Is Fi-
nally, the jury found that when balanced against the mitigating circumstances,
the aggravating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to warrant the death
penalty.1 6 Having so answered these four issues, the jury was obligated to sen-
tence McKoy to death.
In State v. McKoy (McKoy 1), the North Carolina Supreme Court heard
Dock McKoy's appeal as of right and addressed the constitutionality of the sen-
tencing phase instruction that required the jury to consider only those mitigating
circumstances it unanimously found.17 McKoy argued that the United States
Supreme Court's then recent decision in Mills v. Maryland 18 compelled the con-
clusion that such an instruction violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments,
[1]. [That] [t]he capacity of Dock McCoy [sic] to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired.
[2]. That Dock McCoy [sic] has borderline intellectual functioning with a [sic] I.Q. score
of 74.
Id. at 36, 394 S.E.2d at 428.
The jury failed to find unanimously, and answered "no" to, the following mitigating circum-
stances submitted to it:
[1]. This murder was committed while Dock McCoy [sic] was under the influence of
mental or emotional disturbance.
[2]. The age of Dock McCoy [sic] at the time of this murder is a mitigating circumstance.
[3]. That for several decades Dock McCoy [sic] has exhibited signs of mental or emo-
tional disturbance or defect that went untreated.
[4]. That Dock McCoy's [sic] mental or emotional disturbance is aggravated by his poor
physical health.
[5]. Dock McCoy's [sic] ability to remember the events of December the 22nd, 1984, is
actually impaired.
[6]. Any other circumstance or circumstances arising from the evidence which you the
jury deem to have mitigating value.
Id. at 36, 394 S.E.2d at 428-29.
The defense introduced evidence at trial to support these six mitigating circumstances. The
evidence revealed that at the time of his arrest, McKoy had a blood alcohol level of 0.26, more than
two and a half times the level of legal intoxication in North Carolina. Id. at 34, 394 S.E.2d at 428.
The defendant was 65 when the incident occurred. Id. The Clinical Director of the State's forensic
psychiatry unit testified "that defendant had a personality disorder.... [and] that defendant was
under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the time he shot Deputy Home." Id. at
34-35, 394 S.E.2d at 428-29. A psychiatrist from Dorothea Dix Hospital testified that McKoy had
suffered from emotional disturbances and disorders for many years, and that these conditions were
"exacerbated when defendant was impaired by alcohol." Id. at 35, 394 S.E.2d at 428. On December
22, 1984, the day of the shooting in question, when McKoy's neighbor asked him why he had fired
several shots into the air, McKoy responded that" 'everybody else is shooting' and 'well, it's Christ-
mas.'" McKoy I, 323 N.C. at 6, 372 S.E.2d at 14. The defense produced much evidence indicating
not only that McKoy was mentally impaired at the time of the shooting, but also that his recollec-
tion of the events was impaired. When McKoy took the stand to testify on his own behalf, he gave
an outlandish account of what had occurred, including the following testimony:
Some men came to the house and had [him] turn on his T.V. After the T.V. was turned
on.... You could see us, what we were doing in the house on my T.V. After that, at least
forty or fifty "transporters" gathered in front of the house. Eventually, two men came in
the house and started appraising the furnishings.
Brief for the Petitioner at 30, McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990) (No. 88-5909)
(citations omitted).
15. Record at 5, McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990) (No. 88-5909).
16. McKoy 1, 323 N.C. at 39, 372 S.E.2d at 33.
17. Id. at 30-31, 372 S.E.2d at 27-28.
18. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
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and thus mandated a reversal of his death sentence. 19 In Mills, the United
States Supreme Court rejected Maryland's jury instructions and verdict form
because the Court believed "reasonable jurors... may have thought they were
precluded from considering any mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed
on the existence of a particular such circumstance." 20 The McKoy I court re-
jected McKoy's Mills argument, however, and found the issue "clearly settled
contrary to defendant's position." 2 1 The court simply reiterated its holding of
an earlier case that "consistency and fairness dictate that a jury unanimously
find that a mitigating circumstance exists before it may be considered for the
purpose of sentencing."'2 2 The North Carolina court delineated two ways in
which the North Carolina approach differed from the Maryland scheme at issue
in Mills:
In contrast to the Maryland procedure... [North Carolina law] does
not mandate the death penalty where there are no mitigating circum-
stances and at least one aggravating circumstance, nor does it mandate
the death penalty if the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the
aggravating circumstances.... Second, in North Carolina evidence in
effect becomes legally irrelevant to prove mitigation if the defendant
fails to prove to the satisfaction of all the jurors that such evidence
supports the finding of a mitigating factor.
23
The court thus upheld McKoy's conviction and death sentence.
McKoy then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.24 The Supreme
Court flatly rejected both the holding and the reasoning of the North Carolina
Supreme Court and vacated McKoy's death sentence.25 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Marshall maintained that "[d]espite the state court's inventive at-
tempts to distinguish Mills, our decision there clearly governs this case."
26
Because the North Carolina sentencing scheme permitted the jury to consider at
the weighing stage only those mitigating circumstances it unanimously found,
the scheme was constitutionally infirm.27 As it noted in Mills, the Court ex-
horted that "it would be the 'height of arbitrariness to allow or require the impo-
sition of the death penalty' where 1 juror was able to prevent the other 11 from
giving effect to mitigating evidence." 28 Such a rule, the Court recognized, would
lead to the absurd result that-in a case in which several mitigating circum-
stances are possible-a person could be executed because the jury failed to find
unanimously a particular mitigating circumstance, even though all jurors would
19. See McKoy I, 323 N.C. at 31, 372 S.E.2d at 28.
20. Mills, 486 U.S. at 384.
21. McKoy I, 323 N.C. at 31, 372 S.E.2d at 28.
22. Id. at 30, 372 S.E.2d at 27-28 (quoting State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 218, 302 S.E.2d 144,
157 (1983), overruled on other grounds, State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988)).
23. Id. at 40, 372 S.E.2d at 33.
24. McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990).
25. Id. at 1234.
26. Id. at 1231.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1232 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374 (1988)).
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have found at least some mitigating factors present.29
The Court rejected the State's argument that the unanimity requirement
was valid as a parallel to the requirement that aggravating factors be found by a
unanimous jury. The Court held that unlike the elective consideration of aggra-
vating circumstances, "[tihe Constitution requires States to allow consideration
of mitigating evidence in capital cases," and "[a]ny barrier to such consideration
must therefore fall."' 30 Accordingly, the Court vacated McKoy's death sentence
and remanded his case.
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor joined.31 He rejected the Court's characterization of Mills
as controlling authority on the McKoy question. "To be sure," he wrote, "Mills
contains language suggesting that a unanimity requirement would contravene
[prior cases holding that juries must be permitted to consider all relevant miti-
gating factors]. But, under the circumstances, these suggestions were plainly
dicta."'32 Consequently, Justice Scalia found that the precedents upon which the
majority relied were "quite simply irrelevant" to the Court's decision.33 In addi-
tion, he criticized the Court for attempting not only to control what evidence the
jury considers but also to control the way in which the jury considers it.34
In State v. McKoy (McKoy I1),35 the North Carolina Supreme Court ad-
dressed several issues concerning the implementation of the United States
Supreme Court's holding: (1) whether the unconstitutional jury instruction was
merely a trial error or was a more serious deficiency in the capital punishment
statute; (2) whether McKoy error can be harmless error; and (3) if so, whether
the error was harmless in McKoy's case. The court first held that the unconsti-
tutional jury instruction was merely trial error and not an inherent deficiency of
the statute.36 Because the unanimity requirement came from the jury instruc-
tions and the verdict form, rather than directly from the statute, the court re-
jected McKoy's argument that North Carolina's entire capital sentencing
scheme was invalid. 37 The sentencing statute therefore remained in effect and
McKoy was not entitled to a life sentence as a matter of law, the court held,
38
29. Id. at 1231-32.
30. Id. at 1233 (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 1241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1243 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1245 (Scalia, 3., dissenting).
34. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What petitioner complains of here is not a limitation upon what
the sentencer was allowed to give effect to, but rather a limitation upon the manner in which it was
allowed to do so-viz., only unanimously.").
35. 327 N.C. 31, 394 S.E.2d 426 (1990).
36. Id. at 37, 394 S.E.2d at 429.
37. Id. at 39, 394 S.E.2d at 430. The defendant had cited several death penalty cases that were
remanded for the imposition of a life sentence. Id.; see State v. Davis, 290 N.C. 511, 227 S.E.2d 97
(1976); State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 226 S.E.2d 629 (1976); State v. Waddel, 282 N.C. 431,
194 S.E.2d 19 (1973), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597
(1979); State v. Hill, 279 N.C. 371, 183 S.E.2d 97 (1971). In rejecting McKoy's argument that he
was entitled to a life sentence as a matter of law, the court distinguished each of those cases by
illustrating why the relevant sentencing statutes, in fact, had been invalid at the time of sentencing.
McKoy II, 327 N.C. at 40-42, 394 S.E.2d at 431-32.
38. McKoy 11, 327 N.C. at 42-43, 394 S.E.2d at 432-33.
1508 [Vol. 69
CRIMINAL LAW
Next, the court rejected defendant's argument that such faulty instructions
never can be harmless. 39 Because the error was of "constitutional dimension,"
however, the court held that the state bears the burden of proving that the error
was, in fact, harmless.4° Finally, the court was not satisfied that the State had
met this burden in McKoy's case.4 1 It thus remanded the case for resentencing.
For nearly twenty years, the United States Supreme Court has struggled to
define constitutional parameters for systems of capital punishment. In 1972, in
the watershed case Furman v. Georgia,4 2 the Court held that a capital sentencing
scheme giving juries unbridled discretion to impose or not impose the death
penalty violates the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.43 Unconstrained discretion is unconstitutional, the Court rea-
soned, because it permits juries to dole out capital punishment in a discrimina-
tory and capricious manner.44 The Court's action created the new problem of
how to lead juries in their decision-making without imposing strictures so rigid
that they do not allow sentencing juries the opportunity to make an individual-
ized and particular consideration of each defendant's circumstances. 45 Some
states, including North Carolina, responded to Furman by making capital pun-
ishment mandatory for some crimes, thereby removing all jury discretion in im-
posing the death penalty.46 In Woodson v. North Carolina,4 7 however, the Court
held that a mandatory death penalty also violates the eighth amendment because
it does not allow the sentencing jury to make an individualized determination of
the defendant's circumstances.4 8 Thus, the problem of how to narrow the dis-
cretion of juries without imposing unduly rigid strictures continued to exist.
Most states answered with a system that guided the jury's discretion by requir-
ing that the jury find certain defined aggravating circumstances before imposing
the death penalty. In addition, the schemes permitted the jury to consider
whether there were mitigating circumstances that made the death penalty an
inappropriate punishment for the particular defendant.49 The Court upheld
such a capital sentencing scheme in Gregg v. Georgia.50
39. Id. at 43-44, 394 S.E.2d at 433.
40. Id. at 44, 394 S.E.2d at 433.
41. Id. at 45, 394 S.E.2d at 433-34.
42. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
43. Id. at 256-57 ("[D]iscretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are
... not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel
and unusual' punishments.").
44. See id.
45. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) ("[D]iscretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.").
46. The North Carolina Supreme Court held unconstitutional the statutory jury option to re-
turn a life sentence for a first degree murder conviction in State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 445, 194
S.E.2d 19, 28-29 (1973), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 457, 257 S.E.2d
597 (1979).
47. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
48. Id. at 303 ("A... constitutional shortcoming of the North Carolina statute is its failure to
allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each con-
victed defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death.").
49. After Woodson, North Carolina adopted a bifurcated capital sentencing procedure. See
supra note 6.
50. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
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The Court firmly introduced the requirements for the sentencer's considera-
tion of mitigating circumstances in the seminal case of Lockett v. Ohio.51 Reaf-
firming that the jury or factfinder must take every individual defendant's
character and history into account, and noting the impossibility of remedial
measures for an executed capital sentence, the Lockett Court stressed that the
sentencer must be permitted to weigh all relevant mitigating circumstances at
trial. The Court wrote:
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a de-
fendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffered as a basis for a sentence less than
death.52
In a concurring opinion to Eddings v. Oklahoma,53 Justice O'Connor expanded
upon and gave support to Lockett by clarifying that a "trial court's failure to
consider all of the mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death
sentence" and clearly violates Lockett, and is, therefore, impermissible
5 4
The question whether a unanimity requirement violates the holdings of
Lockett and Eddings first reached the Supreme Court in Mills v. Maryland.55 In
Mills, a jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder for the stabbing of
his cellmate in the Maryland Correctional Institution. 56 During the sentencing
phase, the jury completed a verdict form divided into two sections, one for ag-
gravating circumstances and one for mitigating circumstances.5 7 The mitigating
section stated: "Based upon the evidence we [the jury] unanimously find that
each of the following mitigating circumstances which is marked 'yes' has been
proven to exist by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE and each
mitigating circumstance marked 'no' has not been proven by A PREPONDER-
ANCE OF THE EVIDEN4CE."
5 8
On appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals, Mills argued that the jury
might have understood the jury instructions to mean that "a jury that does not
unanimously agree on the existence of any mitigating circumstance may not give
mitigating evidence any effect whatsoever, and must impose the sentence of
death."'
59
51. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Ohio's capital sentencing scheme, like North Carolina's, required an
initial determination of guilt. Id. at 609 (appendix to opinion of the Court). A guilty verdict against
the defendant for aggravated murder compelled the trial judge to sentence the defendant to death
unless the judge found one of three particular mitigating circumstances. Id. at 611-13 (appendix to
opinion of the Court). In Lockett's case, the judge did not find any of those conditions: "Mhe
judge said that he had 'no alternative, whether [he] like[d] the law or not' but to impose the death
penalty. He then sentenced Lockett to death." Id. at 594.
52. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
53. 455 U.S. 104 (1981).
54. Id. at 117 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
56. Id. at 369.
57. Id. at 384-89 (appendix to opinion of the Court).
58. Id. at 387 (appendix to opinion of the Court).
59. Id. at 375.
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The court of appeals affirmed Mills' conviction and death sentence, but did
not hold that, if Mills' interpretation of the jury instructions in fact had been
adopted by the jury, the subsequent sentence would be constitutional. Instead,
the appellate court simply found that such an interpretation was not reason-
able.60 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Maryland court and
found that members of Mills' jury indeed may have followed Mills' interpreta-
tion of the instruction.6 1 The Court then held that a jury instruction which
creates that possibility is unconstitutional. 62 The Court explained that such an
instruction might give rise to a situation in which all twelve jurors believed there
to be mitigating circumstances but, because they failed to find unanimously any
one particular circumstance, they are precluded from considering any mitigating
circumstances in the final sentencing phase.63 Furthermore, such an instruction
might create a situation in which one "holdout vote" could prevent the jury
from considering mitigating circumstances that all eleven other jurors found
present.64 Such a result violates the Lockett principle that the jury not be pre-
cluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence.
The requirement that the jury unanimously find mitigating circumstances
first became part of the North Carolina capital sentencing scheme five years
before Mills. In State v. Kirkley,65 the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld
the unanimity requirement, explaining that it is based on the general premise of
constitutional law that "all verdicts.., must be unanimous."' 66 The court stated
that the jury's ability to consider all evidence in its initial determination of
whether a given mitigating circumstance exists satisfies Lockett.67 As long as
the jury is permitted to determine the existence of all possible mitigating factors,
the Kirkley court held, further consideration of mitigating circumstances should
be no different from that of aggravating circumstances, which the jury must
unanimously find.68 The court held that "consistency and fairness dictate that a
jury unanimously find that a mitigating circumstance exists before it may be
considered for the purpose of sentencing."' 69 After Kirkley, juries in North Car-
olina were instructed that they could consider mitigating circumstances at the
60. Id. at 372. The court of appeals interpreted the statute to require unanimity on "all critical
issues" and concluded, therefore, that the form required "the jury to agree unanimously in order to
mark 'no' with respect to the existence of each mitigating circumstance." Id. If the jury could not
agree unanimously to accept or reject a circumstance, the court stated that the jury should have left
the blank unmarked. Id. at 373.
61. Id. at 384.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 374. It is worth noting that unanimity is not a standard of proof. Burdens of proof
are standards that must be met before any particular juror may consider the evidence. For example,
in McKoy's case, evidence had to be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." McKoy II, 327 N.C. at
35-36, 394 S.E.2d at 428-29. Such a burden of proofis different, however, from telling an individual
juror who is satisfied a defendant has met his burden of proof that he may not consider the evidence
unless all other jurors are equally satisfied.
64. See Mills, 486 U.S. at 373-74.
65. 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983), overruled on other grounds, State v. Shank, 322 N.C.
243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988).
66. Id. at 218, 302 S.E.2d at 157.
67. Id. at 219, 302 S.E.2d at 157.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 218, 302 S.E.2d at 157. Justice Exum, dissenting from the Kirkley majority, stated
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weighing stage of the capital sentencing phase only if they first found unani-
mously that mitigating circumstances were present. Dock McKoy's jury heard
such an instruction.7"
The United States Supreme Court made it clear in Mills, however, that any
restraint, at any stage, on a jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances vio-
lates Lockett.71 The leap from Mills to McKoy v. North Carolina, therefore, was
really only a small step. If the possibility that the jurors in Mills thought they
must find mitigating circumstances unanimously was unconstitutional, surely
the explicit instruction in McKoy should also be unconstitutional. Since the de-
cision in McKoy v. North Carolina, the North Carolina Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that "McKoy error" is present in any case in which the jury instructions
at the sentencing proceeding created "an unacceptable risk that individual jurors
were prevented from considering mitigating evidence in making their sentencing
decision."
'72
In the wake ofMcKoy v. North Carolina, North Carolina courts must resen-
tence all of the defendants who were sentenced under the defective jury instruc-
tions, unless the instructions were harmless. The courts will remedy the
problem on a case-by-case basis as defendants petition for resentencing hearings.
In evaluating the merits of a petitioner's claim, the courts will have to address
four issues. The first issue concerns whether a McKoy error in fact exists; that is,
was the jury subject to the unanimity instruction before sentencing?73 Second,
each reviewing court must determine whether McKoy v. North Carolina is retro-
active: does McKoy cover the particular petitioner, or was his judgment final at
the time this "new law" was established?74 Third, is the petitioner procedurally
barred from raising a McKoy claim? If he did not object to the unanimity in-
that although the majority position "might pass constitutional muster," he did not believe it to be the
best solution to the problem:
I think the better practice would be to instruct: (1) unanimity is not required in order to
answer the question of the existence of a mitigating circumstance favorably to defendant;
(2) such an issue should be answered unfavorably to the defendant only if all jurors agreed
to so answer it; (3) such an issue should be answered favorably to defendant if any juror
would so answer it with an indication on the verdict form as to how many jurors so voted;
and (4) in the final balancing process each juror would be free to consider only those miti-
gating circumstances which he or she were persuaded existed in the case.
Id. at 229-30, 302 S.E.2d at 163 (Exum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
It is important to recognize that aggravating and mitigating circumstances serve two distinct
constitutional purposes and thus should not be treated the same. Aggravating circumstances serve
the purpose of narrowing the sentencer's discretion. They are constricting requirements and, there-
fore, should be unanimously found. If each juror could consider only the aggravating circumstances
she found, the concept of aggravating circumstances would accomplish very little narrowing since
most jurors can find at least one such circumstance present in a murder case.
Mitigating circumstances, on the other hand, serve the purpose of permitting individualized
consideration of the defendant's circumstances and character. See the discussion of Lockett v. Ohio,
in supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
70. See supra text accompanying note 13.
71. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988).
72. State v. McNeil, 327 N.C. 388, 389, 395 S.E.2d 106, 107 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1403 (1991).
73. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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struction at trial, is he barred from raising the issue on appeal?7 5 Finally, was
the error harmless in the petitioner's case?76 McKoy II established that McKoy
error is subject to harmless error analysis, but the onus is on the State to prove
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
77
Determining whether a particular defendant's trial contained McKoy error
is not as simple as it first appears. The juries that sentenced inmates currently
on North Carolina's death row received one of three different instructions re-
garding the unanimity of mitigating circumstances, depending on when the trial
took place. First, in trials after Kirkley,78 courts generally gave juries clear,
unequivocal instructions that they must find unanimously mitigating circum-
stances before considering them in choosing a sentence.7 9 The Kirkley court
explicitly held:
The consideration of mitigating circumstances must be the same
as the consideration of aggravating circumstances. The unanimity re-
quirement is only placed upon the finding of whether an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance exists .... Each circumstance must be estab-
lished by the party who bears the burden of proof and if he fails to
meet his burden of proof on any circumstance, that circumstance may
not be considered in that case.
80
In these cases, McKoy error is clear, and defendants may proceed to the three
other requirements for review.
The second category of jury instructions includes those which are vague on
the question of unanimity. The cases most likely to involve this type of instruc-
tion are those tried before Kirkley. In State v. McNeil,8 1 for example, the jury
instructions did not explicitly require the jury to find unanimously mitigating
circumstances. Three out of four of the sentencing phase issues presented to the
jury began with, "Do you unanimously find .... ,,2 The other sentencing phase
issue-the jury's findings of mitigating circumstances-began only with, "Do
you find .... ,,83 The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that the test for
75. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
77. State v. McKoy (McKoy H), 327 N.C. 31, 44, 394 S.E.2d 426, 433 (1990) ("We recognize
that... it would be a rare case in which a McKoy error could be deemed harmless.... We are
unwilling to say, however, that the State could never meet this burden.").
78. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
79. In seven cases, including McKoy II, the North Carolina Supreme Court already has found
the presence of McKoy error and, accordingly, has vacated defendants' capital sentences and re-
manded for resentencing. See State v. Jones, 327 N.C. 439, 449-50, 396 S.E.2d 309, 315 (1990); State
v. Sanderson, 327 N.C. 397, 402-03, 394 S.E.2d 803, 805-06 (1990); State v. McNeil, 327 N.C. 388,
397, 395 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1403 (1991); State v. Robinson, 327 N.C.
346, 363-64, 395 S.E.2d 402, 412 (1990); State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 343, 395 S.E.2d 412, 428
(1990), cert. denied, 111 S. CL 763 (1991); State v. McKoy (McKoy II), 327 N.C. 31, 45, 394 S.E.2d
426, 433-34 (1990); State v. Brown, 327 N.C. 1, 30, 394 S.E.2d 434, 451-52 (1990).
80. State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 219, 302 S.E.2d 144, 157 (1983), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988).
81. 324 N.C. 33, 375 S.E.2d 909 (1989), vacated sub nom. McNeil v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct.
1516, on remand, 327 N.C. 388, 395 S.E.2d 106 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1403 (1991).
82. McNeil, 327 N.C. at 390-91, 395 S.E.2d at 108 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 391, 395 S.E.2d at 108. The United States Supreme Court vacated McNeil's judg-
ment and remanded the case to the North Carolina Supreme Court "for further consideration in
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McKoy error with respect to jury instructions that did not expressly require una-nimity is "whether there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that the jury here believed it
was required to apply 'the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.' "84 The McNeil court de-
termined that, taken in the context of the other three jury charges, McNeil's jury
reasonably may have understood that it had to unanimously find any mitigating
circumstance before it could consider it in sentencing. 5 The court vacated the
sentence and remanded McNeil for resentencing.1
6
The third category of jury instructions includes those given to some sen-
tencing juries after Mills. Some judges, interpreting Mills and anticipating
McKoy, did not follow Kirkley, but instead instructed juries that they were free
to consider, in final sentencing, any circumstance they found to be proven by the
evidence.8 7 Defendants in such cases are of course not victims of McKoy error
and thus are not entitled to resentencing on McKoy grounds. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has not yet disposed of any cases with these facts.
Once a defendant shows that McKoy error occurred in his trial, he next
must establish that he is eligible for review in light of retroactivity laws. It is
certain that any defendant who was subject to McKoy error, but whose judgment
is not final, deserves McKoy review.88 The most difficult determination concerns
what happens to those defendants whose judgments were final when the
Supreme Court decided McKoy.8 9
light ofMcKoy v. North Carolina." McNeil v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1516, 1516 (1990). Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, dissented from the
Court's grant of certiorari, arguing that "it is... lear... that no unanimity requirement was
involved in this case." Id. at 1516-17 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy maintained that
even though McNeil was sentenced after McKoy I and before McKoy v. North Carolina, McNeil's
jury was not given the defective instructions and therefore his sentence should remain in place. Id.
at 1516 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. McNeil, 327 N.C. at 392, 395 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190,
1198 (1990)).
85. Id. at 393, 395 S.E.2d at 110 ("jiWe are forced to conclude that, in their entirety, the jury
instructions gave rise to a reasonable likelihood that some of the jurors were prevented from consid-
ering constitutionally relevant evidence.").
86. Id. at 397, 395 S.E.2d at 112.
87. In one case, the trial judge instructed the jury on the fourth issue-the weighing issue--as
follows:
In deciding this issue, you're not to consider the aggravating circumstances standing
alone. You must consider them in connection with any mitigating circumstances found by
you, even if the jury has not found, unanimously, the existence of a certain proposed mitigat-
ing circumstance" if an individual juror believes that [the] mitigating circumstance has been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence in a particular case, that juror may consider that
mitigating circumstance in his evaluation on this fourth issue.
State v. Huff, 328 N.C. 532, 537-38, 402 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1991).
The North Carolina Supreme Court, evaluating Huff's remand in light ofMcKoy v. North Caro-
lina, however, found that McKoy error was present, despite the trial judge's instruction. Id.
88. A judgment is final if it falls in one of the three following categories: (1) the case has been
decided on its merits and certiorari has been denied; (2) the case has been decided on its merits,
certiorari has been granted, and the judgment has been affirmed; or (3) the statute of limitations for
petitioning certiorari has elapsed.
89. Neither the federal courts, for the purpose of federal habeas corpus relief, nor the North
Carolina Supreme Court, for the purpose of state post conviction relief, has resolved the question of
whether McKoy applies retroactively to convictions that were already final when McKoy was handed
down. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), set the parameters for retroactivity analysis with re-
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A defendant whose death sentence was tainted by McKoy error next must
face the question of procedural default. Rule 10(b)(2) of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a trial error is generally not grounds
for reversal on appeal, unless objected to and, therefore, preserved at trial.90
One exception arises when the violation constitutes "plain error."91 This stan-
dard is satisfied when "the appellate court '[is] convinced that absent the error
the jury probably would have reached a different verdict.' "92
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Sanderson,93 declined to
require that a MKoy error be reviewed under the plain-error standard when the
defendant failed to object at trial to the error for a trial conducted after Kirkley
and before Mills. The Sanderson court explained:
Kirkley held there was no constitutional or other error in North
Carolina's jury instructions requiring jury unanimity in the finding of
mitigating circumstances. At least until Mills... objection at trial to
the unanimity instruction would have been in vain.
94
Therefore, inmates convicted between Kirkley and Mills automatically pass the
procedural default hurdle. There is no clear indication, however, whether this
analysis will apply to cases tried before Kirkley or after Mills.
The final issue facing a victim of McKoy error is whether, in the particular
spect to federal habeas corpus. In Teague, the Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, stated that "new rules" of constitutional law are not to be applied retroactively to the
cases of federal habeas corpus petitioners whose convictions were final when the Court announced
the new rule, with two narrow exceptions. Id. at 310. It is unclear whether McKoy constitutes a
"new rule" within the meaning of Teague. On the one hand, McKoy was the first Supreme Court
decision to hold unconstitutional a jury instruction that expressly limited the jury to considering
only those mitigating circumstances it unanimously finds. On the other hand, the Court in McKoy
suggested that its decision was simply an application of Mills, which "clearly governs" the case.
McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 1231 (1990). In fact, Justice Blackmun wrote a separate
concurring opinion "only to underscore [his] conviction that Mills v. Maryland controls [McKoy]
and that Mills was correctly decided." Id. at 1234 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Indeed, it is even arguable that Mills itself was not a "new rule," but rather a direct application of
the Lockett requirement that the sentencer not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigat-
ing circumstances.
The retroactivity issue in the context of state post-conviction relief is more unclear than in the
context of federal habeas corpus. The North Carolina Supreme Court, of course, is not bound by
Teague with regard to state post-conviction proceedings, but the State has convinced at least one
North Carolina superior court that a Teague-like analysis should apply to state post conviction
proceedings. If the North Carolina Supreme Court does adopt a Teague-like approach to retroactiv-
ity, then the concerns raised above with respect to federal habeas corpus will become relevant to the
state retroactivity analysis.
90. Rule 10(b)(2) states:
A party may not assign as error any portion of the jury charge or omission therefrom
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly that
to which he objects and the grounds of his objection; provided, that opportunity was given
to the party to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury, and, on request of any
party, out of the presence of the jury.
N.C.R. App. PRO. 10(b)(2).
91. Id. 10(c)(4).
92. State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986).
93. 327 N.C. 397, 394 S.E.2d 803 (1990).
94. Id. at 404, 394 S.E.2d at 807; see also State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 345, 395 S.E.2d 412,
428-29 (1990) ("For the reasons given in State v. Sanderson, we elect not to apply Appellate Rule
10(b)(2), but to apply instead Appellate Rule 2 and consider the McKoy error as if defendant had
timely objected to it at trial.") (citation omitted), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 763 (1991).
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defendant's case, the error was harmless. In McKoy II, the supreme court ex-
pressly held that McKoy error is not harmful per se, but rather must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.95 While conceding that it would be an unusual
case in which McKoy error proved to be harmless, the court held, nonetheless,
that such a finding is possible.96 Because the error is of constitutional magni-
tude, the state bears the burden in each case of showing that the error was, in
fact, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.97 As of this writing, the court has
found this burden satisfied by the state in only one of the cases it has heard on
remand. 9s
The United States Supreme Court's decision in McKoy was not only pre-
dictable, but, according to the Court, it was clearly governed by Mills. Nonethe-
less, the case is noteworthy for several reasons. McKoy was the first major death
penalty case to be heard by the Supreme Court in over fifteen years; and though
the Court's decision leaves the North Carolina sentencing statute intact, the con-
stitutionally infirm jury instructions draw into question the death sentences of at
least twenty defendants. 99 Perhaps most importantly, McKoy finally puts to rest
any doubt that was left after Mills regarding the constitutionality of unanimity
requirements for mitigating circumstances.
CAROLYN AMANDA MARTIN
95. McKoy II, 327 N.C. at 44, 394 S.E.2d at 433 (1990).
96. Id. The court found such a rare case in State v. Laws, 328 N.C. 550, 555, 402 S.E.2d 573,
577 (1991) ("Although an erroneous McKoy instruction may preclude a juror or jurors from consid-
ering a defendant's mitigating evidence, here the jurors' responses to the polling establish that in fact
no such preclusion occurred.... Even giving the most favorable reading to the relatively inconse-
quential evidence that defendant argues supports a finding of the catchall mitigating circumstance,
the McKoy error here is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
97. McKoy II, 327 N.C. at 44, 394 S.E.2d at 433.
98. See supra note 96.
99. See Laws, 328 N.C. at 550, 402 S.E.2d at 574; State v. Huff, 328 N.C. 532, 532, 402 S.E.2d
577, 578 (1991); State v. Quesinberry, 327 N.C. 480, 480, 397 S.E.2d 233, 233 (1990); State v. Price,
327 N.C. 479, 479, 397 S.E.2d 233, 233 (1990); State v. McLaughlin, 327 N.C. 478, 478, 397 S.E.2d
231, 231 (1990); State v. Lloyd, 327 N.C. 477, 477, 397 S.E.2d 230, 230 (1990); State v. Hunt, 327
N.C. 476, 476, 397 S.E.2d 229, 229 (1990); State v. Greene, 327 N.C. 474, 474, 397 S.E.2d 226, 226
(1990); State v. Fullwood, 327 N.C. 473, 473, 397 S.E.2d 226, 226 (1990); State v. Cummings, 327
N.C. 472, 472, 397 S.E.2d 226, 226 (1990); State v. Barnes, 327 N.C. 471, 471, 397 S.E.2d 224, 224
(1990); State v. Artis, 327 N.C. 470, 470, 397 S.E.2d 223, 223 (1990); State v. Allen, 327 N.C. 469,
469, 397 S.E.2d 222, 222 (1990); State v. Jones, 327 N.C. 439, 449-50, 396 S.E.2d 309, 315 (1990);
State v. Sanderson, 327 N.C. 397, 402-03, 394 S.E.2d 803, 805-06 (1990); State v. McNeil, 327 N.C.
388, 397, 395 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1403 (1991); State v. Robinson, 327
N.C. 346, 363-64, 395 S.E.2d 402, 412 (1990); State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 343, 395 S.E.2d 412,
428 (1990), cert denied, I11 S. Ct. 763 (1991); McKoy II, 327 N.C. at 45, 394 S.E.2d at 433-34; State
v. Brown, 327 N.C. 1, 30, 394 S.E.2d 434, 451-52 (1990).
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